Doctrine on the Wrong Foot by Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
Calhoun: The NPS Institutional Archive
DSpace Repository
Faculty and Researchers Faculty and Researchers' Publications
1996
Doctrine on the Wrong Foot
Hughes, Wayne P. Jr.
U.S. Naval War College
Hughes, Wayne P., and Mike Bowman. "Doctrine on the Wrong Foot." Naval War
College Review 49.2 (1996): 108-112.
http://hdl.handle.net/10945/63659
Downloaded from NPS Archive: Calhoun
 In My View. .. 108
 blocks had been put in place for Secretary Forrestal's policy statement confirming a
 continuing U.S. naval presence in the eastern Mediterranean, the event Fisher
 describes in closing his article. The Navy had been in the vanguard of U.S.
 policy toward Europe and the Soviet Union, due to the flexibility of strategic
 thought bred into a generation of U.S. naval officers through study and
 application of the principles of peacetime global forward naval presence and
 wartime forward carrier striking fleet operations.
 This tale has parallels in the situation in which the U.S. naval officers of the
 1990s find themselves. Faced with the challenges of the post- Cold War world,
 the Navy has put together a succession of concepts - "The Way Ahead," . . .
 "From the Sea," and "Forward . . . From the Sea." (See Edward A. Smith, Jr.,
 "What ' . . From the Sea' Didn't Say," Naval War College Review , Winter 1995;
 and Bradd C. Hayes, "Keeping the Naval Service Relevant," U.S. Naval
 Institute Proceedings y October 1993.) These have been rooted not only in
 traditional naval thought (forward presence again) but also in the experience of
 preparing for prosecution of the Cold War Maritime Strategy and of executing
 the naval portions of Operation Desert Storm.
 But there is a difference. In 1945-1946, the United States' "peer competitor,"
 the Soviet Union, and the major theaters of contention - Europe, the Middle
 East, and East Asia - became apparent quite quickly. Today, the world's strategic
 realignment is taking place more slowly and with less clarity. Nevertheless, the
 Navy should continue to study its traditions, its principles, and its recent
 deployment and combat experience. As in 1945-1946, therein will lie much of
 the answer to the next set of intellectual challenges to be faced. While this
 approach will not provide specific solutions to the problems of tomorrow, it will
 certainly provide the firm foundation for seeking those solutions.
 Peter M. Swartz
 Capt., U.S. Navy, Ret.
 Center for Naval Analyses
 Alexandria, Va.
 "Doctrine on the Wrong Fooť
 Sir:
 It is well that the Naval War College Review has encouraged discourse on
 doctrine. When Major General Holley takes issue with doctrine's prescriptive
 nature (see Winter 1996, p. 1 17fi), he addresses the aspect about which the most
 debate has been registered. I do not say that doctrine must be prescriptive. I say
 two things. Doctrine has power to the extent that it is prescriptive. And doctrine
 is self-defining, hence the issuing authority must express itself so as to achieve
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 the right balance between prescription and flexibility. Of course General Holley
 is quite correct to perceive that I think contemporary U.S. naval doctrine needs
 to be stiffened, especially at Echelon 3, governing fleet tactics in littoral warfare.
 That one must prescribe (teach) or be hollow seems self-evident. Naval
 doctrine prescribes the principles of war as sound doctrine. Prescribing them
 means to choose from among them, because some are mutually in conflict. One
 emphasizes the applicable ones for the circumstances. How if one ignores some
 of them? If he does so with marked success he will be a hero. But personally I
 think the principles say too little, not too much, and so have little utility or
 power. They are too abstract, general, and timeless for me. Our teaching should
 be about the here and now.
 The Air Force says that an air campaign will be conducted using the Air
 Tasking Order. It might not say the ATO will always be used to conduct one,
 but Air Force doctrine is prescriptive about the ATO and is much more pointed
 than guidance. That is good. The Army and Marine Corps sometimes complain
 that the ATO structure is too rigid and unresponsive to their needs. If the ATO
 was expressed as something the Air Force might or might not act on, then the
 Army and Marine Corps would have nothing to challenge, Air Force planning
 would drift on a sea of indecision, and there would be no unifying power to
 implement the doctrine of air supremacy.
 My article, "The Power in Doctrine" ( Naval War College Review , Summer
 1995), was an attempt to express the need to write doctrine with the right
 amount of latitude for creative thought and action built in, but not too much.
 Several churches will say there is One God. If they go no further, ecumenicism
 can reign, but His majesty and power over the lives of the faithful are missing.
 As soon as we say God expressed Himself through Jesus, Mohammet, or Buddha,
 then Christians, Muslims, and Buddhists have concrete tenets to follow, but
 universal cohesiveness is lost. If we say instead that God expressed Himself
 through Jesus, Mohammet, and Buddha, we have a compromise that will serve
 mankind with the moral teaching they share in common. Each of the three
 statements, if it is doctrine, says what I may believe and how I may behave.
 What's more, it tells you what to expect about my behavior, and that's very
 valuable. In the choice we see the essence of doctrinal value. But if I tell you
 that religious teachings are mere guidance, which I will take or leave depending
 on whether it's in my own current interest, I have no anchor and you have no
 basis for understanding my behavior or relying on it. Therefore when Holley
 writes that if we fail to establish a common understanding we will be doing a
 great disservice to national defense, I wholeheartedly agree.
 General Holley says that if Captain Hughes will back off from his call for
 mandatory doctrine while retaining most of the power he seeks by encourag-
 ing greater emphasis on uniform techniques and procedures, we may yet
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 achieve effective joint operations. I'll be glad to back off that far, for I don't want
 the services to be dogmatic. With that understanding, now let's get down to
 cases. I shall test the water by proposing that the Air Force take the first step by
 backing off on the doctrine of the ATO. Or does the Air Force think the ATO 's
 unifying, centralized power is too strong to surrender to the whims of the
 other services?
 Wayne P. Hughes, Jr.
 Captain, U.S. Navy, Ret.
 Naval Postgraduate School
 Sir:
 I have taken special note of the excellent article prepared by Captain Wayne
 Hughes, USN, Ret., which appeared in the Summer issue of the Review. Wayne
 is a charter member of the Naval Doctrine Command Academic Advisory Group
 and has worked with our staff over the past three years in reviewing draft
 doctrinal publications.
 Centralized, multiservice naval doctrine is new to the Navy, even if doctrine
 itself is not new. Wayne obviously disagrees with the identification of multi-
 service naval doctrine with the operational level of warfare and wants to see
 more emphasis on tactical-level doctrine. Service-specific, tactical-level doctrine
 is important, but the initial emphasis of the Naval Doctrine Command has been
 the development of multiservice operational (not programmatic) doctrine at the
 operational level of combat. There is much to do here as the military services
 come to grips with jointness and the need for multinational operational-level
 doctrine as well.
 Clearly Wayne has a point, that doctrine must do more than identify what
 we would like to do - that is policy. The distinction between policy and
 doctrine is that the latter governs behavior. Where I disagree with Wayne is
 over the issue of prescriptive doctrine. Our studies of history show us that
 navies have always fared better when the on-scene commander has the
 authority to deviate from doctrine. Doctrine represents the distillation of the
 best knowledge of what one ought to do, in a perfect world; but we must
 always retain the right of our commanders to deviate when it is in their best
 interests. I think that the naval services can come to grips with doctrine that
 is both guidance and flexible.
 Our current efforts to develop doctrine are evolutionary in nature. We have
 spent the past three years relearning the theory of doctrine and gaining an
 understanding of how doctrine is approached by other services, our joint
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